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Abstract
We extend classical ideal point estimation to allow voters to have different preferences when voting in
different domains—for example, when voting on agricultural policy than when voting on defense policy. Our
scaling procedure results in estimated ideal points on a common scale. As a result, we are able to directly
compare a member’s revealed preferences across different domains of voting (different sets of motions)
to assess if, for example, a member votes more conservatively on agriculture motions than on defense. In
doing so, we are able to assess the extent to which voting behavior of an individual voter is consistent with a
uni-dimensional spatial model—if a member has the same preferences in all domains. The key novelty is to
estimate rather than assume the identity of “stayers”—voters whose revealed preference is constant across
votes. Our approach offersmethodology for investigating the relationship between the basic space and issue
space in legislative voting (Poole 2007). There are several methodological advantages to our approach. First,
our model allows for testing sharp hypotheses. Second, the methodology developed can be understood as
a kind of partial-pooling model for item response theory scaling, resulting in less uncertainty of estimates.
Related, our estimation method provides a principled and unified approach to the issue of “granularity”
(i.e., the level of aggregation) in the analysis of roll-call data (Crespin and Rohde 2010; Roberts et al. 2016).
We illustrate the model by estimating U.S. House of Representatives members’ revealed preferences in
different policy domains, and identify several other potential applications of the model including: studying
the relationship between committee and floor voting behavior; and investigating constituency influence and
representation.
Keywords: ideal point estimation, dimensionality, non-parametric Bayesian methods, roll-calls, multiple
comparisons
1 Introduction
Measuring the preferences of political actors is an important—and increasingly necessary—tool
in the political scientist’s tool kit. Indeed since at least the seminal work of Poole and Rosenthal
(1985), a cottage industry has emerged attempting tomeasure the preferences—or “ideology”—of
political actors.1 However, since preferences are never directly observed, inferring them empir-
ically can be tricky. The goal is then to estimate an unobserved, latent trait of political actors
(e.g., members of congress, justices, municipalities, constituencies) based on observed behavior
(e.g., votes, political donations, text, etc.). The resulting revealed preferences are useful, among
other reasons, for theory testing. From scholarship on legislative bargaining (Krehbiel 1998)
to executive-legislative relations (Cameron 2000) to voting and representation (Jessee 2012),
Author’s note: Earlier version of this work were presented at the 2017 Midwest Political Science Association Annual
Conference under the title “Comparing Revealed Preferences Across Multiple Types of Motions in the 83rd to 112th, U.S.
House of Representatives.” This work has benefited from helpful comments from Marc Ratkovic, as well as from three
anonymous referees. Results presented here can be reproduced at https://codeocean.com/capsule/5298256/.
1 The estimated latent traits and position thereon are oen interpreted as ideology, for example, liberal-conservative in
a one-dimensional setting (Jessee 2012). We, however, interpret the position on latent traits as revealed preferences of
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preferences of political actors (medianmember of a legislative body; president and pivotal mem-
bers of Congress; constituents and representatives, respectively) play a crucial role in theories
of various political phenomena. Indeed, Clarke and Primo (2012) suggest such theory-testing is
a characteristic of political science.2
By far the most dominant methodological and theoretical tool in modern political science
for operationalizing the process of inferring preferences from data is the so called spatial model
(Stokes 1963; Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 1970; Enelow and Hinich 1984), in which political
actors’ preferences are represented in Euclidean space. In this context, testing theories of political
behavior and/or institutions oen requires measuring (or estimating) the preferences of different
groups of political actors (e.g., members of the U.S. House and members of the U.S. Senate) on
a common scale. For example, veto bargaining in the domain of legislative-executive relations
(McCarty and Poole 1995; Tsebelis 1995) requires the executive’s and the legislature’s preferences
be measured on a common scale.3
Themain issue in this lineofwork ishowtoensure that thepreferencesof thesedifferentgroups
of political actors are indeed measured on a common scale. While each group of actors can be
scaled independently using, for example, NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1991, 2011) or IDEAL
(Clinton, Jackman, andRivers 2004), ensuring that the resulting scalesare comparable is adelicate
matter. Common approaches to ensure comparable scales include: assuming some common
actors’ preferences do not change (Shor, Berry, and McCarty 2010; Treier 2011); using vignettes to
anchor the scale (Bakker et al. 2014; Asmussen and Jo 2016); assuming some actors’ preferences
change in ahighly parametric fashion (Martin andQuinn2002); and/or ignoring the issueof scaling
actors on a common scale and instead focus on aspects of the distribution of estimated ideal
points invariant to certain transformations (Esteban andRay 1994; Duclos, Esteban, and Ray 2004;
Jessee and Theriault 2014). A less satisfying approach some authors take is to ignore the issue
of comparability and treat scales based on different votes as equivalent (Binder 1999). Lofland,
Rodríguez, and Moser (2017) discuss the limitations and disadvantages of such approaches.
Another version of this estimation problem—measuring the preferences of actors across
different domains of voting—is less studied and there are fewer methods for performing such
comparisons. Being able to make comparisons of a member’s revealed preference in different
domains is growing increasing useful for the study of legislatures. For example, in studying
majority–minority party relations in the U.S. House, Egar (2016) compares voting behavior
between two types of roll-calls: those requested bymajority-party members and those requested
by minority-party members. Theriault (2008) and Jessee and Theriault (2014) argue that partisan
polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives is the result of differential party influence
on member’s voting behavior between procedural votes and votes on final passage. In these
examples the main methodological challenge is to measure (or estimate) the preferences of
a common set of political actors based on behavior in different domains (e.g., roll-call voting
on procedural motions vs. roll-call voting on final passage motions) on a common scale. When
scholarly inquiry requires this type of comparison—for example, between voting in theCommittee
of the Whole versus the House, as in Roberts and Smith (2003); between different issue areas,
as in Jochim and Jones (2013); or between lame-duck sessions and nonlame-duck sessions,
as in Nokken (2014)—votes are usually segregated by type and analyzed separately. A major
disadvantage to this approach is the lack of comparability across scales (if one attempts to use the
inferred ideal points for the comparison), and the challenges of comparing the rank orders (which
are identifiable but difficult to compare, as we illustrate in Section 5.4).
2 See also Krehbiel, Meirowitz, and Woon (2005).
3 We say “the legislature” for simplicity. Many legislatures are bicameral with the different chambers playing different roles.
In such cases each chamber’s preferences—ormore precisely the preferences of the relevant veto players in chamber (e.g.,
the median voter)—need bemeasured on a comparable scale.



















































































































Wedevelopanovel technique toestimate legislators’ revealedpreferences indifferentdomains
of voting on a common scale. In our approach, votes are broken into predetermined groups and
legislators are, in principle, allowed to have different preferences for each group. A hierarchical
Bayesianmodel that uses clustering priors is then used to shrink the number of distinct positions
that a legislators might have. When all votes belong to the same group, or all legislators have
identical positions in all issues, our model reduces to a standard Bayesian item response theory
(IRT)model (Albert and Chib 1993; Clinton et al. 2004). Otherwise, our approach is a strict general-
ization of it that relaxes the usual assumption that all votes are “equal” (for purposes of estimating
latent traits from roll-call votes). To ensure that the latent scales are comparable, our approach
identifies individual whose ideal points do not change across voting domains. The approach is
similar to the bridging-voters approach introduced in Shor et al. (2010) and Asmussen and Jo
(2016) to link measurement scales across the federal and state legislatures in the United States.
However, unlike Shor et al. (2010), our approach does not assume prior knowledge of the identity
of the voters whose ideal points are identical across voting domains, and instead estimates it.4
This paper builds on the work of Lofland et al. (2017), in which a statistical model is developed to
compare ideal points of legislators before and aer an event, for example, the change in majority
party following Senator Jeffords’s (VT) party switch in the 107th U.S. Senate. Their model permits
comparison of revealed preferences between two groups of votes. Here we extend this model to
allow for an arbitrary number of groups by introducing a prior on the set of possible partitions of
the groups inspired by the widely-used Chinese restaurant process prior (Pitman 1996).
In addition to avoiding ex ante assumptions about allowable changes in revealed preferences,
our approachhas several othermethodological advantages. First, our estimationapproach results
in a common scale, which allows us to properly compare the preferences of individuals across vot-
ing domains. In particular, our approach allows for the direct comparison and formal hypothesis
tests across domains. For example, we may now formally test claims of the form “preferences
in domain A are different than those in domain B” at the individual and group level. Second,
unlike most other approaches in the literature, ours allows us to make statements about the
consistency of preferences at the individual-level, the group-level and at the chamber level. This is
a direct consequence of the fact that ourmodel estimates the identify ofmemberswith consistent
preferences in all domains. Third, because it relies on a joint model across all voting domains, the
methodology developed here is a kind of “partial pooling” model for roll-call votes/IRT scaling,
resulting in more precise estimates of preferences in each voting domain (a feature analogous
to the “information borrowing” found in multilevel models). Finally, since our model uses a
hierarchical Bayesian prior, it automatically adjusts for the large number of comparisons involved
in the analysis (Scott and Berger 2006, 2010).
We illustrate our model through an analysis of preferences in different policy domains in the
U.S. House of Representatives using the taxonomy of votes defined by Policy Agendas Project
(hereaer, PAP)major topic groups (Baumgartner andJones 1993; PolicyAgendasProject 2017). As
discussed in Section 3, in this setting, the resulting multiple ideal points estimated by our model
may be interpreted as issue-specific preferences. We are not the first to examine issue-specific
preferences. Gerrish and Blei (2010, 2012a, 2012b) and Lauderdale and Clark (2014) usemeta-data
associated with a vote (specifically, the text of themotion or case being decided) to infer different
aspects of voters’ utility. Their approach is based on the idea that members have preferences
over different issues and that votes are “about” issues in some proportion. They use the text of
a motion to estimate what each vote is “about” (the issues present in a given vote). Despite the
similarities in themethodological objectives of theseworks, there are several differences between
4 While there are someconnections betweenourmodel and thebridging literature, the inferential goals anddata constraints
are different.



















































































































Gerrish and Blei (2012b) and Lauderdale and Clark (2014), including identification, estimation,
and the structure of the model. For example, in Gerrish and Blei (2012b) voters have a main ideal
point and issue-specific adjustments there-from. Identification is met by the use of continuous
shrinkagepriors ondeviations. In Lauderdale andClark (2014), voters are allowed tohavearbitrary
preferences over each issue and identification is obtained by requiring each voter to weigh the
issue-content of the vote the same. Our approach does not directly use the content of the bill.
Instead we use manually curated groups of votes as our metadata (see Section 2 for details).5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the Bayesian model
and prior specification. Section 3 discusses the interpretation of the model, and the relation-
ship between vote group clusters and the classical literature on dimensionality. Section 4 dis-
cusses estimation and identification procedures. Section 5 illustrates the model by examining
the revealed preferences of House members in different policy issue areas, grouping roll-called
votes by PAP major topic. Section 6 discusses the implications of our work and potential future
applications of the methodology.
2 Model
Let yi ,j = 1 if the vote cast by legislator i = 1, . . . , I onmotion j = 1, . . . , J is “Yea” and yi ,j = 0 if it is
“Nay.” Spatial voting models assume that legislators make decisions according to random utility
functions that depend on the distance between the legislator’s preferred policy (their ideal point)
and that of a particular piece of legislation in an unobservable policy space. The exact form of
the utility (e.g., quadratic as in Jackman 2001; Clinton et al. 2004 or Gaussian as in Poole and
Rosenthal 1987; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997) and the random shocks (e.g., Gaussian vs.
extreme value) differ across models.6 In the case of a quadratic loss function with independent
errors over preferences that lie in aD-dimensional Euclideanpolicy space, this leads to a likelihood
of the form
yi ,j | µj ,α j ,β i ∼Bernoulli
(







where β i ∈ Ò
D corresponds to the position of legislator i in policy space (their ideal point), µj
controls the baseline probability of a positive vote (Yea) on motion j, α j ∈ Ò
D controls the effect
of the ideal points of the legislators on the probability of a positive vote on motion j, and G is
an appropriate link function.7 For the purpose of this paper, we assume that G is the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution, that is, we work with a probit model.
We extend this spatial voting model to account for legislators with potentially different ideal
points associatedwith each of Kmutually exclusive groups ofmotions. The groups ofmotions are
identified through (known) indicator variables γ1, . . . ,γJ such that γj ∈ {1, . . . ,K }, that is, γj = k if
andonly ifmotion j is in group k. For example, in the illustration discussed in Section 5, γj indicates
towhich one of themajor PAP categories a vote belongs to.8 The likelihood of this extendedmodel
5 There are additional technical differences between ourwork and theirs. The Gerrish and Blei (2012b)model does not allow
for testing sharp hypotheses directly (you have to postprocess the estimates in a more or less ad hoc way), where as we
can. Further, our approach results in legislator-specific clustering of domains not possible in Lauderdale and Clark (2014).
6 See Carroll et al. (2009) and Clinton and Jackman (2011) for more on the differences between variations on random utility
models and see Carroll et al. (2013) for an empirical comparison of different functional forms
7 This familiar two-parameter IRTmodel (Lord 1952;Rasch 1960) formulationcanbederived fromamoremicro-level account
of voting behavior. For example, the usual quadratic-normal voting model can be described as follows. Each motion j
corresponds to a policy position if passed,Yj and a status quo policy if it fails, N j , each a point in Ò
D . Voter i gets utility
Ui (Yj ) = −| |Yj −β i | |
2 + ηi j if motion j passes and utilityUi (N j ) = −| |N j −β i | |
2 +νi j if it fails, where | | · | | is the Euclidean
norm. If we assume the errors are jointly normal with E (ηi j ) = E (νi j ),V ar (ηi j − νi j ) = σ
2
j
and with η and µ independent






N j )/σj and G becomes the
cumulative normal distribution function in (1). See Londregan (1999) and Clinton and Jackman (2011) for more on the
connections between ideal point estimation from binary voting data and IRT.
8 Onemayquestionour assumption that vote-types are nominal (in the statistics literature this difference is analogous to the
different between block models and mixed-membership models). For example, Gerrish and Blei (2012b) and Lauderdale




















































































































yi ,j | µj ,α j ,β i ,k ,γj ∼ Bernoulli
(




j β i ,γj
))
, (2)
whereβ i ,1, . . . ,β i ,K correspond to the (potentially distinct) ideal points of legislator i oneachof the
groups of motions. Hence, when K = 1, our model reduces to the usual IRT scaling of votes (e.g.,
Clinton et al. 2004) .
Similar to Lofland et al. (2017), we introduce a joint prior for β i ,1, . . . ,β i ,K that allows us to
identify groups of motions for which a given legislator has the same revealed preferences. In this
case, the prior is inspired by ideas frommodel-based clustering. More specifically, we rewrite the
idealpointof legislator i for groupk asβ i ,k = β̃ i ,ζi ,k ,where {β̃ i ,1, β̃ i ,2, . . .} represent the setofunique
ideal points possessed by individual i, and the (unknown) auxiliary variables ζ1, . . . ,ζI ∈ {1,2, . . .}
are such that ζi ,k = ζi ,k ′ if and only if legislator i possesses the same ideal point in the kth and
the k ′th groups of motions. Hence, the indicators ζi ,1, . . . , ζi ,K partition the set {β i ,1, . . . ,β i ,K }
into Li ≤ K legislator-specific clusters; note that if ζi ,k = ζi ,k ′ , then legislator i has the same
preferences over votes in group k as for votes in group k ′. This structure resembles that of a
collection of I independent finite mixture models, each one associated with a different legislator.
We call legislators for which ζi ,k , ζi ,k ′movers between vote group k and vote group k
′, and those
forwhich ζi ,k = ζi ,k ′stayers. Similarly, if ζi ,k = ζi ,k ′ for all k and k
′, then legislator i exhibits the same
preferences on all votes andwe call thema full stayer. If all legislators are full stayers, the extended
model also reduces to the one in (1).
Asmentioned in the introduction,while theapproachof Shor etal. (2010) andShor andMcCarty
(2011) assumes the vectors ζ1, . . . ,ζI are known in advance, we instead treat these indicators as
unknown parameters and aim to estimate them from the data. This requires that we specify a
(joint) prior distribution for the indicator vectors. Following Gopalan and Berry (1998), it would
be natural to assign independent Chinese restaurant priors (Antoniak 1974) with a common
dispersion parameterφ > 0 to each vector ζi , that is,














where Γ (t ) :=
∫ ∞
0
z t−1 exp {−z } is the well-known Gamma function, L(ζi ) = Li is the number of
unique values among ζi ,1, . . . , ζi ,K (i.e., the number of clusters for legislator i),91(·) is the indicator
function, and n l (ζi ) =
∑K
k=1 1(ζi ,k = l ) is the number of groups of motions assigned to cluster l.
Under this model, the prior probability that a given legislator is a stayer between two groups of
votes is 1
1+φ
, the probability that a given legislator is a full stayer is θ := Γ (K )Γ (1+φ)
Γ (K+φ)
, and the prior
number of full stayers, B, follows a binomial distribution with size I and probability θ.
While (3) has a number of appealing features, the use of fully independent priors for each
legislator does not ensure that the different latent spaces share a common scale. Indeed, as
discussed in Lofland et al. (2017), aminimumnumber of stayers (dependent on the dimensionDof
the latent space) are required to ensure identifiability across mutually exclusive groups of votes.
A sufficient condition that is also easy to enforce computationally is the presence of at leastD +1
full stayers. Hence, in this paper we work with the modified prior
and Clark (2014) allow votes to be “about” a mixture of topics. While both approaches have merit and are applicable to
related research questions, we argue that treating vote-type as categorical is naturally appropriate in some settings: votes
adopting restrictive rules are categorically different than other types of procedural votes (Roberts 2010; Moffett 2012);
voting on amotion to recommit is categorically different from, for example, voting on final passage (Duff and Rohde 2012).
9 We discuss the conceptual connections between clusters and dimensions in Section 3. In the illustration, we argue that the
quantity Li can be interpreted as the dimensionality of the preferences of legislator i.




























































































































Γ (n l (ζi ))
}










Γ (K )Γ (1+φ)
Γ (K+φ)
)I−s , (4)
whereΩ is the set of possible {ζ1, . . . ,ζI } containing at least D +1 full stayers. The normalizing
constant in (4) corresponds to the probability of the setΩ under the unrestricted model.
Note that the hyperparameter φ plays a key role in controlling the number of stayers. Hence,
rather than fixing it in advance, we attempt to learn it from the data by assigning it a hyperprior
in such a way that the implied prior on θ, the probability that any one legislator is a full stayer, is
uniform (see Supplementary Material A for a closed-form expression for this prior). This choice is
appealing for a variety of reasons. First, making θ random ensures that the model automatically
adjusts for multiplicities (Scott and Berger 2006, 2010). This addresses concerns related to the
large numbers of comparisons that are intrinsically being made by our model. Second, a uniform
prior onφ implies a uniform prior on the number of stayers for all values of K, which avoids biases
that might arise from the fact that there are many more configurations with around I /2 stayers
than there are configurations with either a very small or a very large number of them.10 Finally,
under a uniform prior for θ, and for the special caseK = 2, our model matches the one developed
in Lofland et al. (2017). We assessed the sensitivity of themodel to this prior choice by refitting the
model using two alternative Gamma priors on φ. First, we considered a Gamma prior with shape
parameter 5 and scale 1, which implies a prior on θ that has mean 0.002 and 95% prior credible
interval of (0, 0.014). Next, we considered a Gamma prior with shape parameter 0.075 and scale
parameter 1, which implies a prior on θ withmean 0.90 and 95%prior credible interval (0.10, 1.00).
The results were the same under all three priors.
In addition to priors on the indicator variables ζ1, . . . ,ζI , we need to specify priors for each
component of the unique ideal points β̃i ,k ,d , i ∈ {1, . . . , I },k ∈ {1, . . . ,K },d ∈ {1, . . . ,D }. As in
Lofland et al. (2017), we assign these parameters independent Gaussian priors with common









, where the hyperparameters ηd and σ
2
d
are given independent, conditionally conjugate priors, ηd ∼ N(0,1) and σ
2
d
∼ IGam(2,1) for every
d ∈ {1, . . . ,D }. In terms of the bill-specific parameters, we follow the literature and work with





and αj ,d | ωd ,τ




independently for all votes j and dimensions d, and where δ0(·) denotes the degenerate measure
placing probability one at zero. The use of a zero-inflated prior for αj ,d enables us to automati-
cally discount the effect of unanimous bills without explicitly dropping them from the analysis.
Finally, the hyperparameters ρ, κ2, ωd , and τ
2 are given priors ρ ∼ N(0,1), κ2 ∼ IGam(2,1),
ωd ∼ Beta(1,1/d ) and τ
2 ∼ IGam(2,1). Besides being in line with priors that are widely used
in the literature, our experience is that the model is also quite robust to the choice of these
hyperparameters.
Ensuring that the scales associatedwith the different vote types, as the formulation introduced
above does, is a nontrivial problem. Simply fitting independent models to each vote type would
only allowus to compare identifiablequantities, suchas the rankorder of the legislators.However,
as we have argued in the introduction, and illustrate in Section 5.4, comparing ranks can be
very misleading, especially when the number of votes in each vote type is relatively small. One
alternative approach a practitioner may be tempted to employ to ensure comparability is to
use the same set of voters to anchor the ends of the scale for each vote group. For example,
constraining party whips to be the extreme voters in each issue area. However, in such a strategy,
10 These issues appears in many other settings, including variable selection in linear models Scott and Berger (2010), and in
estimation of conditional independence relationships in Gaussian graphical models (Armstrong et al. 2009).



















































































































the identity of the set of full stayers is assumed, rather than estimated. Therefore, one loses the
ability to test the hypotheses that, for example, the whips are indeed stayers. Our model retains
that ability. Second, if D > 1 and there are fewer than D + 1 parties, then fixing two whips as
anchors is not enough to get comparability. Lastly, while having two well-selected anchors when
D = 1 is enough for comparability of the scales, the question of howmany full stayers there are in a
given chamber is still important, both because (1) it leads tometrics like the SF andASF that are
interesting by themselves (see Sections 4 and 5.3 below), and (2) it implicitly reduces the number
of parameters that need to be estimated.
2.1 Relationship with Standard Multidimensional Preference Models
One may naturally wonder about the relationship between the number of vote types, K, and the
dimension of the policy space, D. In this section we show our model is not a special case of a
standard multidimensional IRT model (except in the trivial cases when all legislators are stayers
or K = 1). In particular, the specification in (2) with D = 1 (which we use in our illustration) is
not a special case of (1) with D = K . Instead we argue that it is better to think of our approach
as one in which there is common space to measure preference in (even if the measurement is
multidimensional). For example, a K > 1,D = 2 model places ideal points in two-dimensional
space, but allows voters to have different (two-dimensional) ideal points in potentially K different
domains of voting.
Note that the interaction term αT
j
β i in (1) has a simple bilinear structure in which one of the
terms depends exclusively on the identity of the legislator, and the other depends exclusively on
which measure is being voted on. This separable structure is a consequence of the assumption
that the positions of legislators in the policy space are independent of the positions of the bills.
This assumption underlies traditional spatial voting models, including IDEAL and NOMINATE. A
further consequence of the independence assumption is that the matrix of factor loadings is the
same for every legislator. That is, while each legislator has its own unique preferred policies, the
weights associated with each of the dimensions on a given vote is the same for all legislators.
Our model relaxes this assumption by allowing different loadings matrices for each legislator
(see Equation 2).
A small example might be helpful in further clarifying the differences. Assume that there are
only fourmeasures to vote on (i.e., J = 4), two for each of two vote types (i.e.,K = 2), and only two
legislators (i.e., I = 2). If the first legislator is a stayer but the second legislator has different ideal






















for the first and second legislators, respectively. By definition, standard IRTmodels cannot accom-
modate this type of structured interaction terms.
3 Clustering and Dimensionality
The model just introduced can be used to bear on the discussion of dimensionality of classical
voting models, which has been a popular topic in the political science literature (see, e.g., Koford
1989; Wilcox and Clausen 1991; Potoski and Talbert 2000; Talbert and Potoski 2002; Aldrich, Mont-
gomery, and Sparks 2014; Dougherty, Lynch, andMadonna 2014; Roberts, Smith, andHaptonstahl
2016).



















































































































What constitutes a dimension is surprisingly not widely agreed upon. In a common interpreta-
tion, each dimension is associated with a set of substantive issues (in two-dimensional models,
typically economic and social issues). This interpretation relies on the oen held—but rarely
checked—assumption that voting dimensions align with the content of the bills.11 However, at a
technical level, the dimensionality of the voting is simply the number of latent traits required to
accurately model legislators’ voting behavior. Hence, from a technical point of view, choosing the
dimensionality of the policy space is essentially a model selection problem in which we aim to
balancemodel fitwithmodel complexity, and thedimensions in the latent spaceof a spatial voting
model do not need not correspond to any politically relevant substantive issues. Recognizing this,
Poole (2007)makes theuseful distinctionbetweenabasic spaceandan issue space. In this section,
we build on this distinction to provide an interpretation for our model in situations in which the
indicators γi ,1, . . . ,γi ,J partition the bills into groups that correspond to substantive issues for each
legislator i (such as in the illustration in Section 5).
Standard spatial votingmodels assume that every legislator has preferences over the same set
of issues—that the dimension of the space is fixed and common. Motions load differently on each
of these shared dimensions (however they are interpreted) to determine how a specific legislator
votes. Therefore, the votingbehavior of legislators for allmotions canbeexplainedasa linear com-
bination of the latent features; bills ostensibly focused on substantive issues would be expected
to have similar loadings on dimensions, and those loadings are the same for every legislator. In
the specific case of a one-dimensional voting model, each vote can be explained by differentially
weighting a single, legislator-specific latent trait. If the voting patterns for a substantial group of
bills cannot be well explained in this way, then a two-dimensional voting model might be more
appropriate. When the group of bills that is not well explained by the one-dimensional model
happen to correspond to those bearing on a well-defined set of substantive issues, then the basic
and issue spaces agree and the traditional interpretation of the dimensions of the latent space in
terms of issues is appropriate. However, if the set of bills that require the additional dimension
do not align with particular substantive issues, then the validity of this traditional interpretation
of the dimensions is suspect and it becomes important to distinguish between the dimension of
the basic space and the dimension of the issue space. Furthermore, in either case, if a dimension
is added, it is added for all legislators even if this additional latent trait does not contribute to
explaining the voting pattern of some voters. If that is the case, the corresponding ideal point on
the addeddimensionwill unnecessarily increasemodel complexity (via the number of parameters
to be estimated for the legislators for which the additional dimension is irrelevant).
Our model works in a subtly different way. If linear combinations of a common set of low-
dimensional latent traits are capable of explaining the voting behavior of most legislators for
every substantive issue, our model will simply identify most of the legislators as full stayers. As
discussed before, in that case our model corresponds to a traditional spatial voting model (as
would be expected). However, if there is a subset of legislators whose voting pattern on certain
groups of votes cannot be well explained through a common set of linear combinations of the
latent traits, our model will introduce an additional set of legislator-specific ideal points. In the
case inwhich the dimension of the basic space isD = 1, and the bill groups being compared reflect
substantive issues, the total number of ideal points associated with these particular individuals
can be interpreted as the dimension of their preferences (i.e., the dimension of legislator-specific
issue spaces). In thisway, ourmodel allowsus to investigate the interrelationbetween substantive
issues and the intrinsic dimensionality of the policy space.
Finally, we discuss our model in light of the interpretation of dimensions in spatial models.
Benoit and Laver (2012) and De Vries and Marks (2012) discuss theoretical, epistemological, and
11 There are some notable exceptions, namely, Wilcox and Clausen (1991); Crespin and Rohde (2010); Lee and Schutte (2017).



















































































































methodological issues when “dimensionalizing” political space. Broadly speaking, there are two
approaches:aposteriori (inductive) andapriori. In the former dimensions are specified in advance
of measurement/ estimation. Examples of such approaches include the policy-dimensions work
of, for example, Clausen and Wilcox (1987) and Wilcox and Clausen (1991). In the latter, dimen-
sions are estimated as latent traits, and interpreted ex post. The classical NOMINATE and related
models are an example of this approach (Poole and Rosenthal 1985). In either approach, the
key epistemological challenge is the same: “The ‘spaces’ of interest are ultimately metaphors
and both the dimensions spanning these spaces and agents’ positions on these dimensions are
fundamentally unobservable.” (Benoit and Laver 2012, p. 196) Our approach may the thought
of as an intermediate compromise to the determination of “substantively relevant dimensions”
in the language of Benoit and Laver (2012), having both inductive and deductive components.
Namely, we start with (strong) priors on the structure of the conceptual space (by placing each
vote in exactly one category we are effective putting a prior of 100% that a vote v is of type g).
And then inductively estimate the “. . . bundles of particular salient policy issues on which agents’
preferences are inter-correlated” (Benoit and Laver 2012, p. 205). This interpretation requires the
vote-categories to be (at least prima face) related to dimensions spanning the conceptual space.
4 Estimation
Estimation of the model parameters is performed using a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
algorithm (Robert and Casella 2005). To facilitate computation, we introduce auxiliary random
variables




j β i ,γj ,1
)
,
such that yi ,j = 1 if zi ,j ≥ 0 and yi ,j = 0 otherwise (Albert and Chib 1993). Conditional on these
auxiliary variables, the full conditional distributions for µj andαj ,d follow a normal and an inflated
normal distribution, respectively. Similarly, the parameters ρ, κ2, ωd , and τ
2 follow Gaussian,
inverse gamma, beta, and inverse gammaposterior distributions, respectively. On the other hand,
the indicators ζi ,k and the unique ideal points β̃ i ,k are sampled using a slight variant of the
collapsed Gibbs sampler described in Neal (2000). The associated concentration parameter φ is
sampled using a random walk Metropolis Hastings on the logarithmic scale. Finally, the hyper-
parameters ηd and σ
2
d
have Gaussian and Inverse Gamma full conditional posterior distributions,
respectively. To mitigate well-known issues with potential multimodality in mixture models, we
execute multiple runs of the MCMC algorithm starting at overdispersed points, and monitor the
(unnormalized) posterior distribution of the model, as well as the ASF metric described below.
Convergence for each of the chains is assessed using the criteria in Geweke (1992).
We use a number of summaries of posterior samples to address substantive questions of






1(ζi ,1 = ζi ,2 = · · · = ζi ,K ), (5)
that is, the proportion of full stayers. Values of the ASF close to 1 indicate that most legislators
exhibit a single set of revealed preferences across all vote types. In particular, ifASF = 1 then our
analysis of that particular set of votes is equivalent to fitting a D-dimensional IDEAL model to the
data. Similarly, we also construct issue-specific ASF metrics.
In addition to chamber-level measures of consistency we also construct micro-level metrics.
Thesemetrics involve the legislator-specific partitionsof votes impliedby the indicators ζ1, . . . ,ζI .
We construct point estimates for the partitions by minimizing an expected loss function based



















































































































on pairwise clustering probabilities, Dk ,k ′,i = Pr(ζi ,k = ζi ,k ′ | Data) (see Lau and Green 2007 for
details). As we discussed before, in the context of the application we introduce in Section 5, this
partition provides information about the dimensionality of the issue space, and by extension,
about how various substantive issues are correlated. Finally, we construct estimates of issue-
specific legislators’ preferences, β i ,k in order to systematically characterize differences in voting
patterns, both at the issue and the legislator levels.
4.1 Identifiability
Two key identifiability issues need to be addressed in order to utilize the posterior samples from
the algorithm. The first one relates to the well-known label switching problem that arises in
mixture models (Celeux 1998; Stephens 2000). We avoid this problem by focusing our inference
procedures on quantities that are invariant to the relabeling of the classes, such as ASF , Dk ,k ′,i ,
or β i ,k . The second one relates to the arbitrariness of the latent scale on which preferences are
being embedded. Indeed, although the use of a minimum number of stayers in our prior on
ζ1, . . . ,ζI ensures that the different groups of bills share a measurement scale, that common
scale is still arbitrary. To resolve this issue we add a further constraint by fixing the location of
the first component of the ideal point vector for D + 1 legislators (Rivers 2003). We call these
legislators anchors (as opposed to the stayers discussed above in the context of linking the
different latent scales together). For example, in the unidimensional setting (D = 1) we might fix
βi1,1 = −1 and βi2,1 = 1, where i1 and i2 identify thewhips of the twomain parties in the legislature.
These constraints are enforced by postprocessing the posterior samples, an approach sometimes
referred to as parameter expansion (Liu, Rubin, and Wu 1998; Bafumi et al. 2005). The identity
of the anchors has no effect on the posterior inferences associated with ζ1, . . . ,ζI and, in our
experience, only a negligible impact on inferences for the ideal points themselves (Lofland et al.
2017).
5 Illustration: Voting Patterns by Policy Issue
We illustrate the model through an analysis of preferences in different policy domains using
recorded votes from the 97th to 114thU.S. House of Representatives (1981–2016). Motions brought
to a vote in the U.S. Congress differ thematically by substantive issue (e.g., the economy, envi-
ronment, criminal justice, etc.). We use the PAP main topic coding to categorize roll call votes
by issue area (Adler and Wilkerson 2017; Policy Agendas Project 2017). This taxonomy, which
consists of 20 mutually exclusive major topics (e.g., Macroeconomics, Health, Environment, etc.),
has been used to study legislative agendas (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and attention (Jones
and Baumgartner 2005), among other matters.12 We focus on the PAP categorization for two
reasons. First, the application to issue areas illustrates the novel technical contributions of the
model, namely (1) comparable revealed preferences across issues and (2) estimates of legislator-
specific dimensionality. Second, as argued in Section 3, applying the model to votes grouped
by issue area is relevant to the literature on dimensionality (Talbert and Potoski 2002; Aldrich
et al. 2014; Roberts et al. 2016) by providing issue-specific revealed preferences and an estimate of
individual consistency—the posterior probably that a member has the same revealed preference
in each issue area. However, we stress this is only an illustration of themodel. We discuss possible
additional applications to various questions in political science in Section 6.1.
We fit the model described in the previous sections independently to each of the 18 Houses
mentioned above. We work with D = 1, which is both a common choice in the U.S. House (Poole,
Rosenthal, and Koford 1991; Poole 2007), and a convenient one in terms of model interpretation
12 This taxonomy, while popular andwidely used, could be criticized on a number of points (Dowding, Hindmoor, andMartin
2013, 2016). Most notably, one may wonder if a roll-called vote fits cleaning into one and only one topic. While such
considerations are valid, they are not of concern in the present work.
















































































































































































Reagan GWH Bush Clinton GW Bush Obama
Democrat control
Republican control
Figure 1. Average Staying Frequencies (ASF ) for the 97th to 114th U.S. Houses. The symbol and color of the
points indicate the party on control of the chamber, while the grey area separate different presidencies.
(recall our discussion in Section 3).We start the analysis from the early 1980s as this is comfortably
aer the reforms of the mid-1970s. We end in the 114th due to data availability. Because of the
rarity of some topics, we only include topics that tend to consistently have at least 20 votes in
most Houses. The resulting data-set has K = 17 groups.13 We have also removed from the dataset
any legislator that missedmore than 25% of the votes taken during the session.14
5.1 Aggregate Analysis
Figure 1 presents the posterior mean of the ASF defined in Equation (5), E [ASF | Data]. The
symbol and color of the points indicate the party on control of the chamber, while the grey area
separate different presidencies. We can see that the staying frequency in the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives remained low and relatively stable during the Reagan and GWH Bush presidencies,
but increased steadily aer that. That is, until the early 1990s we find evidence of considerable
differences in issue-specific preferences. The main exception to this pattern is the 112nd House,
when ASF dropped sharply. The 112nd House corresponds to the second half of the first term of
President Obama. Not only was this a House in which the Republican party retook the chamber,
but it also saw an influx of new legislators that rode the Tea Party wave into office. Thewillingness
of these legislators to vote against their party leadership in a number of issues might explain the
relatively low value of theASF during this session of the House.15
We can also disaggregate the ASF results across PAP issues. Figure 2 shows posterior means
for issue-specific staying frequencies. To construct these frequencies, we define the base cluster
for each legislator as their cluster of issues that contains themost votes. For legislators that are full
stayers, all issues belong to their base cluster. We define issue-specific average staying frequencies
as the probability that an issue belongs to a member’s respective base cluster, averaged over all
13 Specifically, we drop votes having PAP major code 9 (Immigration), 13 (Social Welfare), and 18 (Foreign Trade). We give
the complete frequency of vote-types by Congress in Supplementary Material B. Eliminating these three topics does not
reduce the total number of measures included in the analysis by much: the percentage of votes included in the analysis
varies between 91% (for the 98th House) and 97% (for the 112th House), with a median of 95%.
14 Although this threshold for inclusion might seem high, we still retain most of the legislators in every session: the number
fluctuates between 402 (in the 97th House) and 428 (in the 109th and 113rd Houses), with a median of 424.
15 The rise in extra-dimensionality of voting in the 112th is curious and le for future study. An alternative explanation to the
Tea Party votersmight involve the agenda. We note that this session sawmore Energy, Environment, and Defensemotions
and fewer recorded votes on International Affairs and Government Operations than the preceding sessions. Another
possible explanation may lie in the interplay of vote type (e.g., amendment, final passage) and issue area. We note that
Jochim and Jones (2013) find an increase in amendments in an issue-area corresponds with an increase in dimensionality
of that issue (but that this relationship has diminished over time).




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Probability of an issue being deviant (97th to 114th Houses).
legislators. These issue-specificASF s can be interpreted roughly as the propensity for an issue to
be “extra-dimensional.” Formally it is the posterior probability that an issue is deviant—exhibits
different preferences from a member’s preferences in their base cluster. Overall, the pattern we
observed for the full ASF appears again for these issue-specific ones. However, the patterns
change slightlywith each issue. For example, while themost issue-specificASF s fall substantially
during the 112th House, the drop is quite small for Public Lands and Law and Order. During the
104th House, the issue-specific ASF for the Civil Rights and Science issues drops substantially,
while theASF for Public Lands increases substantially.
Jochim and Jones (2013) examine the dimensionality of legislative choice in the House (1965–
2004), with focus on the relationship between party unity and issue dimensionality. They do so
by scale roll-call votes separately in each PAPmajor topic code (W-NOMINATE) and use subjective
inspectionof scree-plots to determinedimensionality of each issueover time (Cattell 1966). There,
they distinguish between distributive policy (e.g., trade, agriculture, public lands) and social
policy (e.g., civil rights and social welfare). They expect distributive issues to bemultidimensional
because distributive policy is important for constituencies and hence for reelection. As a result,
distributive policies are less subject to party pressure (Deering and Smith 1997).16 They find
distributive issues such as science, trade, agriculture, public lands, and transportation to be mul-
tidimensional issues and find issues associatedwith intervention in the economy like housing and
macroeconomics tobe consistently uni-dimensional, owing topartisan conflict.17Wequalify these
findings in a number of ways. First, while economic issues (e.g., housing, labor, macroeconomics)
appear to be low-dimensional (high ASF ) at one point in time (e.g., since the 110th), they are
not uniquely low-dimensional compared to other issue-areas and certainly were not always 1-D
issues. For example, in the 99th, these issues were among the most multidimensional. Second,
we disagree with their finding that Environment and International Affairs were stable (or even
16 This is not to say our approach can directly estimate party influence in voting (Snyder Jr. and Groseclose 2000;
Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr., and Stewart III 2001; McCarty et al. 2001; Cox and Poole 2002). Rather, extant methods of
estimating party influence could be combined with our approach to provide a direct comparison of (differential) party
effect in different domains of voting (e.g., Crook and Hibbing 1985; Jessee and Theriault 2014).
17 Mixed support for this argument can be seen in Gerrish and Blei (2012b) who find that energy and public lands (both
distributive issues) show the most adjustment of member’s preferences, but they also find economic issues such as
appropriations and finance to be deviant as well. Jochim and Jones (2013) find economic issues to be consistently low-
dimensional.



















































































































increasing in dimensionality). We find both have decreased in dimensionality (at least until the
111th house).18 Lastly, while we agree that in general, dimensionality has been decreasing over
time,butwe find that the reasons fordoing somaybemultiple. Figure2 showthatwhile theoverall
level of extra-dimensionality at the chamber level may be similar over time, the reasons for this
might bemuch different. For example, the 104th House is an example in which the dimensionality
of issues varies enormously across issue-areas. Compare this to the 112th, which has roughly the
sameASF . In the 112th, however, all issues have roughly similar issue-specific ASF .
5.2 Comparison with Multidimensional Spatial Models
Followingourdiscussion fromSection3, onemaywonder if our scaling technique is simplypicking
up extra dimensions estimated by traditional methods. That is, one may wonder if ASF is simply
capturing variance that could otherwise be explained by introducing additional dimensions in the
model. To demonstrate that this is not always the case, we present in Figure 3, a comparison of
the variance in the votes explained by the first dimension of a W-NOMINATE model (Poole and
Rosenthal 2000) to our ASF metric.19 The curve connects the different Houses in time, and is
meant to help visualize the joint evolution of both metrics. The trajectory in Figure 3 suggests
that ASF is indeed capturing something other than the lack of goodness-of-fit of a traditional
1-D spatial model, particularly in more recent years. Indeed, while both metrics have tended to
increase over the last 35 years, they have not always done so simultaneously. The most striking
example of divergence comes during Barack Obama’s presidency, when the percentage of vari-
ability in the first dimension of W-NOMINATE remains high all along, but the ASF swings widely.
Other examples include the transition from the 98th to 99th Houses, which shows an example
of voting becoming more unidimensional according to W-NOMINATE but with a decreasing ASF ,
and the transitions from the 97th to 98th and from the 104th to 105th, where the ASF remained
approximately constant, but the percentage of variability in the first component of W-NOMINATE
varied substantially. Likewise, in Reagan’s era (e.g., 97th–100th Houses) ASF is consistently low,
but the adequacy of (and evidence for) uni-dimensional space as estimated by NOMINATE varies
considerably. Taken together, it is clear that the two metrics are capturing different aspects of
political conflict.
5.3 Legislator-Level Analysis
Oneof the key contributions of our approach is its ability to providemicro-level information about
the behavior of specific legislators. To this end, we introduce the individual staying frequency of a
legislator i:
SFi = Pr(ζi ,1 = ζi ,2 = · · · = ζi ,K | Data).
This quantity is the posterior probability that legislator i has consistent preferences across all
domains of voting—that legislator i is a stayer.20
18 The reason for these discrepancies likely lies in the “subsetting” of data and their method of inferring the dimensionality
of an issue. Roberts et al. (2016) show that the level of aggregation of votes (committee, chamber, etc.) affects inference of
dimensionality using roll-call votes. Further, by subsetting votes, estimates are necessarily less precise, increasing chance
of reaching (some) incorrect conclusions (owning to increased sample variability).
19 Eigenvalues from W-NOMINATE are a tool to assess dimensionality of the underlying space. The eigenvalues provided by
theW-NOMINATEanalysis represent theamountof variability explainedbyeachdimension.Asexpected, a largeproportion
of the total variability comes from the first. This proportion can be interpreted as a rough gauge of uni-dimensionality.
Overall, we see that, for the U.S. House, a uni-dimensional model is commonly adequate, but the second dimension is not
entirely without weight, a point made in Poole (2007).
20 An interesting theoretical question naturally arises: “whywould a legislator have different revealed preferences in different
domains of voting?” While a through treatment of this question is outside the scope of the current paper, in the context
of the illustration, possible explanations might include: differential influence of factors affecting voting (Vandoren 1990);



















































































































Figure3.Ratioof the first eigenvalue to thesumof the first twoeigenvalues fromW-NOMINATEversusAverage
Staying Frequency (97th to 114th Houses). Shape represents majority party during the corresponding House
(Democrats in circles, Republicans in triangles). Line type represents presidential eras.
We illustrate the legislator-level analysis using results from the 111th House. We focus
on this particular House for this detailed analysis because it is the one with the smallest
number of movers, and therefore, the easiest one to understand. Figure 4 shows the posterior
median associated with the ideal point estimate rank of legislators arising from the standard,
uni-dimensional model in (1) (along the x-axis) along with 95% credible interval (in grey)
for the 111th House. All legislators with a SF lower than 0.5 are highlighted, although only
some of the identities are included for legibility. Legislators that are not highlighted have a
SF higher than 0.5 and are considered full stayers. We can see that movers are distributed
across the ranks, with most of the Democratic movers being relative centrists, and most
of the Republican movers being to the right of the party. As a complement, we present in
Figures 5 and 6 the identity of the 50 legislators with the lowest and highest SF values,
respectively. The legislatorswith the lowest SF values aremore or less equally distributed among
the two parties. Furthermore, many of themover’s names are well known as individuals willing to
buck their party and/or were cross-pressured by their constituency, for example, Young (R AK-1)
who oen appears as voting “deviant,” and Rohrabacher (a Republican from California known for
expressing positions contrary to theRepublicanparty at the time, e.g., on immigration andRussia)
and Berry (a Blue Dog Democrat from Arkansas). On the other hand, the vast majority (∼ 80%) of
the individuals with high SF values belong to the Republican party.
Our model not only provides information about the identity of movers, but also about the
nature of the issues in which they are movers, and the direction of preference changes. Similar
differential constituency interest/ attention to different policy areas (Clausen 1973; Peltzman 1984; Miler 2016). We note
this as an avenue for future research in Section 6.










































































































































Figure 4. Ideal point estimates for 111th House from a uni-dimensional model with “movers” (i.e., legislators
exhibiting a SF lower than 0.5) highlighted. There are 100 such legislators, only a subset of the names are
included for readability.
Figure 5. Legislators with the lowest SFi values during the 111th House.



















































































































Figure 6. Legislators with the highest SFi values during the 111th House.
to the procedure we used to define issue-specific ASF s, start by defining a member’s basic
ideal point as their ideal point in their base cluster, and say a member has deviant preferences—
preferences different than their basic ideal point—on issues not in their base cluster. Figure 7
compares member’s basic ideal point against the ideal points associated with four PAP issues
for legislators in the 111th House (Banking and Finance, Civil Rights, Government Operations, and
Macroeconomics). More specifically, these ternary plots show the probability that a member’s
ideal point in a specific issue is either leof, right of, or the sameas their basic ideal point. An issue,
g, is representedby three regions: the same revealedpreference in that issue andamember’s base
cluster (no move, on the top); revealed preferences for issue g more liberal than her base ideal
point (leward move, bottom le portion of a triangle); and revealed preference in issue gmore
conservative than her base ideal point (rightward move, bottom right). Legislators in the top no-
move region have a posterior probability that their revealed preference for issue g is the same as
their base ideal point greater than 0.5. If a legislator’s probability of moving is greater than 0.5,
then we classify the direction of the move depending on which is more likely.
Banking and finance is one example of an issue that exhibits clear and consistent partisan
patterns of preference change. In particular, note that the vast majority of lewards movers in
this topic are Republicans, while the vast majority of rightward movers are Democrats. A similar
pattern can be seen for Government Operations. We also observe issues on whichmembers show
no partisan or directional pattern of preference change, for example, macroeconomics.
We compare our illustration to Gerrish and Blei (2012b). While a direct comparison is not possi-
ble (as there voters have a main preference and issue-specific deviations), some of the insights
provided by both models are similar.21 Gerrish and Blei (2012b) find votes on appropriations,
21 Arguably the main substantive finding in Gerrish and Blei (2012b) is that party polarization is greater on procedural votes
than traditional ideal point estimates indicate. We consider procedural votes, votes at different stages of legislation and
party polarization in a separate paper (Moser, Rodríguez, and Lofland 2019).



















































































































Figure 7. A selection of four issues in the 111th House, the name and direction of preference change.
finance, energy, and public lands to have the most movement (issues for which issue-specific
preferencesdeviate themost frommembers’ basepreferences, roughlyakin toourdeviant issues).
Likewise, they find that issues with the least amount of movement to be defence and military,
education and foreign policy. Looking at the 111th House in particular, they find members prefer-
ences on Civil Rights to exhibit very little deviance from their base preference, which is somewhat
different from our findings. We both, however, do find a considerable amount of movement/
deviance in the domain of Government Operations.
Figure 7 can also be used to track the behavior of specific legislators on different issues.
We focus on two Representatives by way of example: Rep. Paul (R TX-14) and Rep. Young
(R AK-1).22 Representative Paul (R TX-14) is estimated to be an extreme conservative (Figure 4)
and a member with many multiple issue-specific ideal points (Figure 5). Representative
Paul exhibits more liberal preferences (than his basic preference) in Banking, Civil Rights,
Government Operations, and Macroeconomics (Figure 7).23 This is roughly consistent with his
stated positions as a Libertarian. Conversely, Representative Young (R AK-1) is a moderate
Republican (Figure 4) also with more than one ideal point (Figure 5). This member exhibits
more conservative preferences on Microeconomics and more liberal preferences on Government
Operations.
22 We focus on these twomembers primarily because they have been identified elsewhere as “extreme lawmakers” (Gerrish
and Blei 2012b). We also identify them as such, but note several others as well, see Figure 4.
23 Gerrish and Blei (2012b) estimate Paul to havemore liberal preferences on Civil Rights andmore conservative preferences
on Health and International Affairs.




















































































































To provide some intuition and validation for the results discussed in the previous sections, the top
panel of Figure 8 compares the (posterior median) ranks of voters in a particular vote-group (in
this case, the ranking ofmember’s revealed preferences in the domain of Government Operations
during the 111th House) obtained by fitting a 1-D IDEAL model to that subset of votes alone, to
the (posterior median) ranks obtained by fitting a 1-D IDEAL model to the whole set of votes.
Intuitively, we expect members that our model estimates as movers would depart significantly
from the diagonal. This approach mimics a procedure that has become common practice in the
literature to identify changes in revealedpreferences. Then, thebottompanelof Figure8compares
the (posterior median) rank in the particular vote-group as estimated by our model against the
same (posterior median) ranks obtained by fitting a 1-D IDEAL model to the whole set of votes.
Both graphs make it clear that there is a group of Republican legislators (most notably, Paul
[R TX-14], Chaffetz [R UT-3], McClintock [R CA-4], Linder [T GA-7], Lummis [R WY], Goodlate [R
VA-6], and Gohmert [R TX-1]) that demonstrate less conservative preferences in votes related
to Government Operations than they do on other votes.24 However, there are also important
differences between the two graphs. In particular, the graph that is based on our model is less
noisy (bottompanelof Figure8). This isbecauseour jointmodelborrows informationacrossvoting
domains to estimate the ideal points, leading to lower uncertainty.
In addition to providing initial validation our results, this simple example illustrates the chal-
lenges associated with using independent models for each issue as a tool to identify movers. In
particular, it illustrates that the change in ranks for some of the legislators might be too small to
be detected under the higher noise level associated with the relatively small samples involved
with independentmodels. Figure 8 also highlightswhy attempting to address differences in voting
preferences by visually comparing ranks across voting domains (rather than the underlying ideal
points) can be quite misleading. For example, note that our model identifies as movers a number
of relatively centrist legislators (such as Republicans Young [R TX-14] and Ros-Lehtine [R FL-27],
and Democrats Davis [D TN-4], Driehaus [D OH-1], Ross [D AR-4], and Teagle [D NM-2]), whose
ranks vary relatively little, particularly when compared against the large changes we observe for
the group of Republican legislators discussed in the previous paragraph. These legislators would
be particularly hard to identify as outliers in the top panel of Figure 8. Conversely, a number of
Democrats near the median of the party exhibit large differences in the rankings across domains,
but our model does not identify them as movers (as can be seen in the lower-le region of the
graph in the top panel of Figure 8). A key issue to appreciate here is that the uncertainty associated
with the estimates of ranks varies drastically. Generally speaking, the uncertainty associated with
the rank of legislators that are close to the median voter of their own party tends to be much
larger than the uncertainty associated with the ranks of centrist or radical legislators (Figure 4).
Similarly, the uncertainty in the estimates of the ranks can vary substantially between parties (in
the case of the 111th, the uncertainty associated with the ranks of Democrats is much larger than
that of Republicans). As a consequence, changes in ranks for centrist, partisans and Republicans
are easier to identify. Additionally, it isworth stressing that the ranks of the different legislators are
not independent variables: If a legislator becomes more extreme, others will necessarily become
less so. Hence, comparing ranks as outlined above (as opposed to comparing ideal points) cannot
establish the source of the change. While the discussion above only addresses the issue of validity
in one domain, and for one House, a similar pattern can be seen in the rest of our analyses.
24 A careful look into the history of these legislators suggests that this is not happening because they have moderate views
in this topic. Instead, it is likely that this change in voting behavior is due to them casting protest votes. In other words,
these legislators are likely voting against the Republican mainstream, rather than with the Democrats. This particular
example serves to demonstrate the differences between revealed preferences (which is what spatial voting models are
able to capture) and ideology.



















































































































Figure 8.Comparison of posteriormedian ranks for legislators in the 111th House onGovernment Operations
votes under various models (Democrats as circles; Republicans as triangles). Labled legislators correspond
to those our model has identified as movers in this particular topic.




















































































































We developed a novel Bayesian model extending classical ideal point estimation methods to
enable the joint estimation of voters’ preferences across different domains of voting. The model
places the resulting estimates of amember’s ideal point on eachofK groups of votes on a common
scale so that, for example, the revealedpreferencesof amemberwhenvotingonagriculture canbe
compared to their preferences on defense. The key innovation is to estimate, rather than assume,
the identity of full stayers—voters with the same ideal point in all domains. This is achieved using
a combination ofmixture priors that ensure enough full stayers, alongwith classical identification
techniques that anchors the scale.
We applied the model to the U.S. House of Representatives (97th to 114th) using PAP major
topic codes to group votes. In this setting, we found that consistency of members’ preferences
(the posterior probability that amember exhibits the same revealed preferences in different issue
areas) varies over time. At a chamber-level, the consistency is generally low until the 106th/107th
House, when the chamber-level consistency increases dramatically (but with a notable exception
in the 112th, see Figure 1). The reason for low preference consistency across issues also differs:
many legislators may have deviant preferences on a small set of issues (as in the 104th); or there
may be many issues that legislators show deviant preferences on (e.g., 112th, see Figure 2). Using
the PAP grouping of votes, we explored how preferences differ across issues.
6.1 Other Potential Applications
We end with some possible applications of the model presented here in different avenues of
study.
• Our estimation technique results in a common measurement of the revealed preferences
of voters in different domains (this measurement might or might not be one-dimensional).
This allows for a direct comparison across domains, to compliment indirect comparisons
of behavior across domains. The commonality of the measurement (e.g., scale) allows for
comparisonof individuals (e.g., “doesmemberX votemore liberally on issueA thanon issue
B?”) and of groups (e.g., “are partiesmore polarized/unified/dispersed on procedural votes
than amendments or final passage?”). The latter question is important for both questions
of party polarization (Roberts and Smith 2003; Theriault 2008; Duff and Rohde 2012) and
legislative organization (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).
• Our approach allows us to test sharp hypotheses. This is a new feature in the literature.
For example, we may now formally test the claim “[t]he presence of departing members
[in lame-duck sessions] created a legislative environmentmarked by increased ideological
andparticipatory shirking...” (Nokken 2014, p. 440) by comparing ideal points in regular and
lame-duck sessions estimated on a common scale.25
• Themethodology developed here is a kind of “partial pooling”model for roll-call votes/IRT
scaling, resulting in more precise estimates (a feature analogous to the “information bor-
rowing” found in multilevel models).
• Related, this approachprovides aprincipledandunifiedapproach to the “granularity” issue
in the analysis of roll-call data (Crespin and Rohde 2010; Roberts et al. 2016). The issue in
that subliterature is the level of aggregation used in roll-call analysis.26 It has been noted in
the literature that the level of aggregation of roll-call votes used in ideal point estimation
matters for the resulting dimensionality of the latent space (Crespin andRohde 2010).27 The
25 There is nothing wrong with the analysis in Nokken (2014), which compares the frequency of different “types” of votes in
regular and lame-duck sessions along with passage rates in the two sessions. But ideally, the research would compare the
distribution of ideal points (and features thereof, e.g., variation) between different votes types. This is precisely what our
method allows for, among other features.
26 “... whenwe comparemore narrowly defined issue areas, it might no longer be plausible to explain voting with only one or
two dimensions” (Crespin and Rohde 2010, p.981).
27 Scholars have argued—and presented both empirical and theoretical support—that the finer the grouping of votes, the
more likely multidimensional latent spaces are found (Harding 2008; Roberts et al. 2016). Conversely, when all votes in a
session are used in scaling, 1 or 2 dimensions swamp other aspects of political conflict (Poole 2007; Aldrich et al. 2014).



















































































































model presented here offers an alternative approach to the question of level-of-votes used.
By scaling all votes together, but allowing votes to be distinguished by type (e.g., issue), we
borrow information across vote types whilemaintaining a common scale, and allowing the
dimensionality of the issue space to depend on the legislator.
• There are applications to the dimensionality of voting literature (Poole et al. 1991; Wilcox
and Clausen 1991; Potoski and Talbert 2000; Roberts et al. 2016). It is well-known that even
though the overall structure of voting may be summarized via a unidimensional model,
the underlying votesmay not be (Crespin and Rohde 2010; Dougherty et al. 2014; Roberts
et al. 2016). Less is known about the dimensionality of individual voter’s preferences. Our
approach allows for estimation of legislator-specific dimensionality.
These methodological enhancements have several possible applications and allow for new
questions to be asked. We list some here.
• First, we note that some theories of legislative committees posit (require, actually) that
committee members are preference outliers relative to the floor (Denzau and Mackay
1983; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988). Some empirical tests of
these claims rely on third parties’ assessments of members’ preferences (e.g., ADA scores,
Krehbiel 1990). By grouping committee member’s votes by context (committee, floor),
our approach allows for a direct comparison of voting in committee versus voting on
the floor.
In that setting, a kind of scarcity is present: all committee members (can) vote both in
their committee and on the floor; but noncommittee members cannot vote in committee,
only on the floor. Nonetheless, our approach allows for a direct comparison of committee
members’ revealed preference with those when voting in committee to the floor (e.g., the
median member’s ideal point on the floor). This is seemingly relevant for the committee-
outlier debate in the House (Snyder Jr. 1992a, 1992b; Groseclose 1994a, 1994b; Brown et al.
1997).
Related, one coulduse the commonscale arising fromour estimator to study committee-
floor voting and gate-keeping (Snyder Jr. 1992b) by comparing the position of ideal points
revealed in committee to those revealed on the floor.
• Recently, we have used the common scale produced by our method to study the dynamics
of polarization in the House (Moser et al. 2019). There, we use the comparability of ideal
points to study the dynamics of polarization in different procedural domains of voting. We
find that votingonamendments contributes to increasingpolarization in themodernHouse
to a greater degree thanpreviously found (Theriault 2008; Pump2010; Jessee andTheriault
2014).
• Since estimation results in a partition of vote types (issues) for eachmember, onemay per-
form a clustering analysis of issues. On which issues do members have the same revealed
preferences (which issues appear in member’s clusters together)? Exploring these issue-
associations over timemay be of use for the study of issue-evolution (Clausen and Cheney
1970; Carmines and Stimson 1986, 1990; Wilcox and Clausen 1991; Baumgartner et al.
2009; Lee and Schutte 2017). Indeed, our approach could be used to integrate the a priori
approach with the a postiori approach. Our model is hence useful for engaging with some
of the fundamental research questions of the policy-dimensions approach: “... identify[ing]
individual members and groups of members that deviate from a consistent ideological
position. We can then explain these deviations in terms of substance: the limitations of
the unidimensional view are revealed by the meaningfulness of the deviations from it.
Such deviations are meaningful in terms of party, region, constituency, and philosophy of
government” (Wilcox and Clausen 1991, p. 404).
• One could, in principle, examine the representative-constituency connection by, for exam-
ple, regressing changes in revealed preferences in a specific policy (e.g., agriculture) on
constituency characteristics, amongothers.Wealso note thatmost studies of issue-specific
preferences (e.g., Clausen 1973; Wilcox and Clausen 1991; Anderson 2012) rely on extra-
chamber factors, such as interests group ratings. Our approach couldpotentially contribute



















































































































to that literature by providing estimates of issue-specific preferences that are comparable
across issues.
• Aswementioned in Section 3, the approach taken here is useful for exploring the difference
between the basic space and the issue space (Poole 2007; Benoit and Laver 2012) by
incorporating both inductive and deductive approaches to the interpretation of dimen-
sions. Related, issue-specific preferences are a matter of interest for a number of scholars,
for example, Clausen and Wilcox (1987), Clausen (1973), Sulfaro (2000), Anderson (2012),
Jochim and Jones (2013). The estimator developed here has potential usefulness to such
scholars as it permits estimation of preference on a specific issue that is comparable to
preferences on other issues.
• Lastly, we note that our approach permits new questions to be studied: when members
exhibit different revealed preferences in different domains, why do they do so? For exam-
ple, past scholarship has identified preferences over agricultural policy to be substan-
tially different then general ideology (Mayhew 1966; Hurwitz, Moiles, and Rohde 2001). We
are now in a position to attempt to explain such differences quantitatively (our method
gives a way to construct a quantitative “deviance” (of preference) on for example, agri-
culture. One could use this as a dependent variable in a regression on, for example,
constituency attributes or other factors used in the representation literature (Miller and
Stokes 1963; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979; Peltzman 1984; Poole and Romer 1993; Brennan
and Hamlin 1999; Clinton 2006; Miler 2010; Lapinski 2013; Sulkin, Testa, and Usry 2015;
Miler 2016).
Appendix A. Derivation of the Prior on the Concentration Parameterφ
Our goal is to select a prior forφ such that the induced prior on θ = Γ (K )Γ (φ+1)
Γ (K+φ)
, the probability that
any legislator is a stayer, follows a uniform distribution on the unit interval. The density of such
prior must satisfy p(φ) =
 dθdφ
, and has support on the [0,∞) interval. Now,
 dθdφ





Γ (φ+1)Γ ′(φ+K )
[Γ (φ+K )]2

= Γ (K )
Γ (φ+1)
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denotes the digamma function. Note that, for K = 2, the prior reduces to p(φ) =
(φ+1)−2, a (shied) Pareto distribution. Figure A1 shows the shape of this prior distribution for two
different values of K. Note that the prior tends to concentrate more around zero for higher values
of K. It is also worthwhile noting that, while this is a proper distribution, it is heavy tailed. Indeed,
since Γ (φ +1)/Γ (φ +K ) = 1/QK−1(φ), where QK−1 is a polynomial of degree K −1, this prior has
only K −2 finite moments.



















































































































Appendix B. Number of Votes by Vote-Type, U.S. House of Representatives
Table B1. Frequency of PAPmajor topic recorded votes by House. Source: Policy Agendas Project.
House Macro- Civil Health Agri- Laborand Education Environment Energy Trans- Law and Housing Banking and Defense Science International Government Public
number economics rights culture employment portation crime finance affairs operations lands
97 81 16 16 31 20 9 36 22 39 31 14 28 112 29 46 190 62
98 40 20 30 38 28 32 30 19 25 26 21 33 123 31 51 209 65
99 62 12 20 43 15 11 28 9 42 32 26 23 124 13 91 224 47
100 33 41 30 17 17 11 21 16 38 36 32 25 156 27 88 230 76
101 45 32 16 29 20 25 33 10 32 30 12 33 96 16 85 243 66
102 36 16 26 11 35 22 11 10 31 42 23 52 94 38 67 259 100
103 58 37 30 17 43 48 21 12 40 89 20 30 86 46 59 305 108
104 106 45 32 36 41 18 63 33 46 87 25 54 113 36 87 343 77
105 53 49 31 32 17 48 31 8 28 66 27 49 75 16 137 366 74
106 71 26 72 40 18 55 45 11 29 100 14 56 89 40 93 295 101
107 72 36 49 17 28 41 18 24 36 56 10 43 94 14 78 276 36
108 99 33 88 24 36 31 13 30 49 55 9 67 153 17 119 250 78
109 54 66 49 39 22 46 20 55 41 78 22 66 148 25 139 227 44
110 69 57 97 47 44 116 49 89 61 68 91 131 205 43 105 407 131
111 47 36 79 29 28 110 50 45 64 71 27 168 148 49 78 440 126
112 98 31 87 40 33 27 146 163 63 55 33 103 215 28 34 295 105
113 57 14 64 48 20 36 98 125 38 46 16 88 155 27 35 197 99
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Figure A1. Prior distribution for the concentration parameterφ for various values of K.
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